With the 2026 scoring season officially launched, we look forward to reviewing Social Good Organizations’ (SGOs) 2025 Financial Statements (FS) and Annual Reports (AR) as early as possible. Below is the schedule to ensure alignment with the 2026 campaign.
Published: January 27, 2026 | Geneva – Switzerland
With the 2026 scoring season officially launched, we look forward to reviewing Social Good Organizations’ (SGOs) 2025 Financial Statements (FS) and Annual Reports (AR) as early as possible. SGOs are encouraged to upload these documents directly to their SGO profile or to share a public link by email.
All 2026 rankings—including the World Top 200 SGOs, USA Top 100 SGOs, and Brazil Top 100 SGOs—will be officially published on Tuesday, June 24, 2026.
This page sets out the official schedule, participation principles, and scoring rules applicable to the 2026 edition.
As an independent media and scoring platform, thedotgood does not require mandatory payment for an SGO to be selected, scored, or ranked. Any SGO may be assessed, including non-members.
However, SGOs that wish to ensure inclusion as a contestant and benefit from structured follow-up, profile management, and related services are encouraged to join thedotgood as members.
Starting in 2026, membership will also provide access to the Leading SGOs Community, which will be formally introduced in the coming weeks.
For newcomer SGOs, participation requires that an official profile be created and maintained directly on the thedotgood website.
Please note that being scored does not automatically result in being ranked, as rankings are determined by relative performance and final scores.
Last Tuesday, the 28th of May 2026, marked six months since Operation Contenção took place in the Penha and Alemão Complexes, in Rio de Janeiro’s North Zone. A total of 122 people were killed, including five police officers who took part in the operation. At the time, the state government declared that the operation had been carefully planned, that its results were significant, and that it represented progress in the fight against organized crime.
Six months later, it is time to examine Fogo Cruzado’s data before and after the operation to determine whether it actually produced any meaningful change in the area.
In the Penha neighborhood and surrounding areas, we recorded 35 shootings in the six months following the massacre. In the six months prior to the operation, there had been 37. Armed violence in the area did not decrease. We recorded 18 people shot in the post-operation period, compared to 14 beforehand: six deaths versus five, and twelve injured versus nine.
These numbers are not surprising to anyone who follows the historical data. We have documented this pattern repeatedly: a major police operation, a high death toll, workers caught in the crossfire, schools and essential services suspended, declarations of success — and then a return to normality, with the same geography of violence and the same groups controlling the territories. The Comando Vermelho was not dismantled in October. The territories it controls in the Penha Complex remain under its dominance. The main target named at the time, portrayed as public enemy number one, remains at large. And after him, new “public enemies number one” have already emerged.
This is not a problem with the execution of one specific operation. It is a problem with the model itself. Large-scale police operations generate an immediate human and financial cost, produce political imagery and rhetoric, and deliver results close to zero in terms of genuinely dismantling organized crime. Of the security agents who participated in the operation, only 504 used body cameras. After the release of 9,000 videos, the Federal Police estimate that analyzing the footage will take three years. While the 122 deaths from October have still not been fully investigated, public debate has already moved on to the next promise.
This pattern has deep roots. The three largest police massacres in the history of Rio de Janeiro state have all taken place in recent years: Jacarezinho in 2021, Vila Cruzeiro in 2022, and now Penha and Alemão. Each was presented at the time as a turning point. None altered the path of the organized crime. According to data from the Historical Map of Armed Groups, Comando Vermelho expanded its territorial control by 89.2% between 2007 and 2024 and today controls areas where 1.6 million people live in the Rio metropolitan region.
Operation Contenção was presented as an answer. Our data show that it was not: it was yet another operation carried out without strategic planning, verifiable objectives, and no mechanisms for post-operation evaluation.
In 2025, 39% of the shootings in Greater Rio occurred during police operations, resulting in 936 people shot and 460 killed. The policy of confrontation did not recover a single territory. Instead, made 61 stray-bullet victims and disrupted the routine of 565 schools.
Six months after the largest massacre in the country’s history, the question that remains is simple: what has changed in the public security policy of the state of Rio de Janeiro? What goals were established? Which indicators are being monitored? What accountability has there been for the 122 deaths?
Carlos Nhanga, Regional Coordinator for Fogo Cruzado in Rio de Janeiro