All 2026 thedotgood scorings—including for the World Top 200 SGOs, USA Top 100 SGOs, and Brazil Top 100 SGOs—will follow new additional rules related to financial reporting.
Published: January 27, 2026 | Geneva – Switzerland
As part of our ongoing efforts to strengthen scoring quality and comparability, thedotgood introduces enhanced Financial Reporting criteria for the 2026 edition of the upcoming rankings.
All 2026 scoring—including the World Top 200 SGOs, USA Top 100 SGOs, and Brazil Top 100 SGOs—will follow the new rules.
From now on, financial transparency will be assessed along three additional distinct dimensions:
Each dimension is governed by specific and non-overlapping rules.
SGOs are expected to make their Financial Statements publicly accessible.
This penalty reflects a fundamental lack of financial transparency and overrides all other Financial Reporting considerations.
When Financial Statements are available, they must clearly indicate when they were made public.
In such cases, no delay-based calculation can be performed.
Delay-based scoring applies only when a verifiable publication date is disclosed.
Bonus for early publication
Penalties for late publication
No inferred or assumed publication dates are used under any circumstances.
Delay-based penalties apply exclusively when Financial Statements disclose a verifiable public release date.
In the absence of such a date, delay cannot be assessed and delay-based penalties do not apply.
This principle ensures methodological consistency, auditability, and equal treatment across all SGOs.
Timely, accessible, and well-documented financial disclosure is essential to:
The 2026 rules are designed to clearly distinguish between:
| Situation observed | Rule applied | Score impact |
| Financial Statements missing for the last two fiscal years | Availability rule | –120 points |
| Financial Statements available but no publication date disclosed | Traceability rule | –15 points |
| Financial Statements published before April 15, 2026 | Timeliness bonus | +20 points |
| Financial Statements published >180 days after fiscal year-end, with date disclosed | Timeliness penalty | –10 points per month, capped at –60 |
| Financial Statements published on time (≤180 days), with date disclosed | Neutral | 0 points |
Last Tuesday, the 28th of May 2026, marked six months since Operation Contenção took place in the Penha and Alemão Complexes, in Rio de Janeiro’s North Zone. A total of 122 people were killed, including five police officers who took part in the operation. At the time, the state government declared that the operation had been carefully planned, that its results were significant, and that it represented progress in the fight against organized crime.
Six months later, it is time to examine Fogo Cruzado’s data before and after the operation to determine whether it actually produced any meaningful change in the area.
In the Penha neighborhood and surrounding areas, we recorded 35 shootings in the six months following the massacre. In the six months prior to the operation, there had been 37. Armed violence in the area did not decrease. We recorded 18 people shot in the post-operation period, compared to 14 beforehand: six deaths versus five, and twelve injured versus nine.
These numbers are not surprising to anyone who follows the historical data. We have documented this pattern repeatedly: a major police operation, a high death toll, workers caught in the crossfire, schools and essential services suspended, declarations of success — and then a return to normality, with the same geography of violence and the same groups controlling the territories. The Comando Vermelho was not dismantled in October. The territories it controls in the Penha Complex remain under its dominance. The main target named at the time, portrayed as public enemy number one, remains at large. And after him, new “public enemies number one” have already emerged.
This is not a problem with the execution of one specific operation. It is a problem with the model itself. Large-scale police operations generate an immediate human and financial cost, produce political imagery and rhetoric, and deliver results close to zero in terms of genuinely dismantling organized crime. Of the security agents who participated in the operation, only 504 used body cameras. After the release of 9,000 videos, the Federal Police estimate that analyzing the footage will take three years. While the 122 deaths from October have still not been fully investigated, public debate has already moved on to the next promise.
This pattern has deep roots. The three largest police massacres in the history of Rio de Janeiro state have all taken place in recent years: Jacarezinho in 2021, Vila Cruzeiro in 2022, and now Penha and Alemão. Each was presented at the time as a turning point. None altered the path of the organized crime. According to data from the Historical Map of Armed Groups, Comando Vermelho expanded its territorial control by 89.2% between 2007 and 2024 and today controls areas where 1.6 million people live in the Rio metropolitan region.
Operation Contenção was presented as an answer. Our data show that it was not: it was yet another operation carried out without strategic planning, verifiable objectives, and no mechanisms for post-operation evaluation.
In 2025, 39% of the shootings in Greater Rio occurred during police operations, resulting in 936 people shot and 460 killed. The policy of confrontation did not recover a single territory. Instead, made 61 stray-bullet victims and disrupted the routine of 565 schools.
Six months after the largest massacre in the country’s history, the question that remains is simple: what has changed in the public security policy of the state of Rio de Janeiro? What goals were established? Which indicators are being monitored? What accountability has there been for the 122 deaths?
Carlos Nhanga, Regional Coordinator for Fogo Cruzado in Rio de Janeiro